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CORPORATE LIQUIDATION AND SECURITIES
LAW-PROBLEMS IN THE DISTRIBUTION
OF PORTFOLIO SECURITIES
ALAN R. BROMBERG*
A. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers are generally aware of the impact of securities laws on
corporate organization, reorganization and financing. Little attention
has been given, however, to the effect of these laws on corporate liqui-
dation or dissolution.'
Securities law has nothing to do with the liquidation of a corpora-
tion which owns no securities. Cash or tangible property is distributed
to the shareholders, usually on surrender of their certificates of stock
in the corporation and with a termination of the legal existence of the
corporation. But if the liquidating corporation owns portfolio securi-
ties,' there may be problems.
Lest the reader become unduly alarmed, he is assured that most
liquidations raise no securities law questions even if portfolios are
distributed. This article attempts to show why. Direct authority is
scanty and the argument is in terms of analogies and general princi-
ples. Doubtful regions are mapped with suggestions for safe passage.
This consideration is limited to voluntary dissolution (since the
other kind rarely witnesses distribution of portfolio securities to share-
holders) and to complete liquidation (since the other kind raises fewer
* Assoc. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist School of Law. A.B. 1949, Harvard
University; LL.B. 1952, Yale Law School.
1 In this article, "liquidation" and "dissolution" are used almost interchangeably.
The former emphasizes the process of winding up and distribution, the latter the tech-
nical extinction of the corporation.
2 This term embraces general investments and securities of subsidiaries. It does not
include securities issued by other companies in a merger, consolidation or purchase of
assets to which the liquidation is incidental. The latter situation is covered by SEC
Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. 230.133 (Supp. 1961), and is reached only tangentially in this
article; see text para. C(2) & note 55 infra.
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questions). In general, the discussion is confined to ordinary business
corporations not subject to special regulatory statutes.' Although
closely held corporations are not excluded, their problems are easily
solved; 4 consequently, the analysis is directed mainly at publicly held
companies. Finally, dissolutions incident to mergers and similar reor-
ganizations are ignored except insofar as their special features help
analyze the one-corporation situation.'
B. BACKGROUND
A corporation holding portfolio securities and contemplating liqui-
dation has two basic alternatives: (1) sell the securities to third per-
sons and distribute the proceeds, or (2) distribute the securities pro
rata to its shareholders. Corporate law generally exercises no influence
on this decision. At dissolution, the net assets are held for the stock-
holders and may be distributed (except probably for liquidation pref-
erences of preferred stock') in cash or in kind.'
Other factors may influence the choice between sale to strangers
and distribution to shareholders. For example:
(1) Buyers may not be readily available.
(2) Distribution may be preferable for tax reasons.'
3
 Thus, public utility holding companies are excluded except for occasional references,
notes 19, 24. So are corporations registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
54 Stat. 789 (1954), 15 USC §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1958). Section 25, 54 Stat. 826 (1940), 15
USC § 80a-25 (1958) [hereinafter cited by sections of the actj, gives the SEC certain
powers over their reorganizations which are defined by § 2(a) (32) (E), 54 Stat. 790
(1940), 15 USC § 2 (1958), to include dissolution or liquidation. On the other hand, an
investment company which for any reason is unregistered is (by virtue of § 7(a) (5), 54
Stat. 802(1940), 15 USC § 80a-7 (1958)) not required to register because of transactions
incidental to its dissolution. It would therefore appear to be covered by the treatment in
the text.
4 See discussion of Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended,
15 USC 77d (1958), 1st clause, infra note 16.
a See note 2 supra.
8
 Cf. text accompanying note 33 infra.
7
 See, in general, Ballantine, Corporations 725, 734-35 (1946) ; authorities are col-
lected in 16 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 8134 nn. 87-88 (perm. ed. rev. rep]. 1942).
Representative statutes are: Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 281 (1953) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32,
§ 157.79b (1954) ; N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1004a (effective Apr. 1, 1963). It is a corol-
lary that stockholders take corporate assets subject to corporate debts; see, e.g., Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 8 § 1.194 (1953). Cf. Schrage v. Bridgeport Oil Co., 31 Del. Ch. 305, 71
A.2d 882 (1950) (plan for liquidating distribution of small fractional interests in numer-
ous oil properties held unfair to small shareholders).
8
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 337 eliminates most of this advantage. Prior to the
enactment of § 337, if upon liquidation the corporation distributed the assets in kind to
the shareholders, it was not liable for a capital gains tax, even though the shareholders
disposed of the assets upon receipt. This was diluted somewhat by Court Holding Co.
v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 331 (1945), where a capital gains tax was imposed upon the
corporation as it had negotiated for the sale of the assets prior to the distribution to the
shareholders, who, upon receipt of the assets, sold them to the same party.
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(3) Time limits imposed by tax aspirations may be insufficient to
find buyers, 5
(4) Continuity of control may be desired, e.g., where a subsidi-
ary is spun off, a new corporation endowed with part of the business
is split off, or a holding company passes out of existence (for reasons
of simplification or otherwise) and distributes the stock of various
subsidiaries.
Whatever the reason, care should be exercised to comply with the
securities laws. For example, a violation of the federal provision cre-
ates civil liability enforceable against the liquidating corporation" and,
quite possibly (by virtue of local law), against its shareholders as
transferees" and against its directors." Moreover, if the corporation
is liable, so are the persons who control it." There is no reason to sup-
pose that this liability terminates with dissolution of the corporation,
especially where state statutes preserve the corporate existence after
dissolution for purposes of enforcing liabilities."
C. THE "SALE" REQUIREMENT OF THE SECURITIES ACT
One of the most important questions with which the liquidating
corporation and its advisors are faced, is whether the distribution of
portfolio securities to the shareholders constitutes a sale within the
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933.' 5 Of the numerous features
of the Securities Act, the most important for the purposes here con-
sidered is the registration of securities. This is required whenever there
is a "sale" or "offer" of a security."' "Sale" is defined to "include every
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 337 requires distribution within 12 months of the adop-
tion of the plan of liquidation in order to avoid recognition of gain on sales made in
the course of the liquidation. The shareholder's gain on liquidation which is recognized
for tax purposes may be limited in accordance with Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 333, if all
the corporate property is transferred within one calendar month. For analysis of these
provisions, see Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 263-
72, 282-98 (1959). There may simply be a rush to liquidate before another year's fran-
chise tax becomes due or in order to give stockholders their gain or loss in the current
income tax year rather than the next one.
19 Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 USC § 77e (1958).
11 Cf. text accompanying note 7 supra.
12 See Ballantine, Corporations 732-33 (rev. ed. 1946). Authorities on directors'
liability are collected 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 13 (1960).
13 Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 USC § 770 (1958).
For definition of control see note 52 infra,
14 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 278 (1953) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.95
(1954); N.Y, Bus. Corp. Law § 1005 (Effective Apr. 1, 1963). Cf. Melrose Distillers,
Inc. v. U.S., 359 U.S. 721 (1959) (state continuity statute prevents abatement of fed-
eral anti-trust liability; indictment preceded dissolution).
15 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 USC §§ 77a-77aa (1958) [hereinafter cited
by sections of the act".
16 Securities Act § .5. "Sale" or "offer" is also essential to civil liability under § 12.
3
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contract of sale or disposition . . . for value.'" 7 "Offer" is defined to
"include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer
to buy . . . for value."" Because of the word "include," these cannot
be regarded as exclusive definitions. However, no others are given, and
it is hard to imagine any reasonable one without the concept of "value,"
which term is prominent in both parts of the statute."
In the context of these provisions, three theories tend to negate a
"sale" in a liquidation distribution to shareholders.
I. No Value Given by Shareholders in Liquidation. The most
obvious of the theories is geared to the dependence of "sale" on
"value." To be sure, it has been suggested that a shareholder gives
value when he relinquishes in dissolution the rights evidenced by his
certificate. 2° Realistically, though, there is no "value" since the trans-
action itself dissipates all the assets of the corporation and terminates
its existence, thus making the stock and stockholder status totally
worthless. Even if it be thought that the shareholder gives "value," it
can hardly be true that the corporation receives "value"; it gets only
a piece of engraved paper to be buried in a transfer agent's or an
attorney's file. 21 Moreover, civil relief under the federal law would be
a mockery since it enables the purchaser "to recover the consideration
paid,' which would be the surrendered certificate or stockholder
status in the defunct entity.
Certain exemptions from registration are provided by §§ 3-4. The only one with wide
applicability to corporate liquidations is § 4(1) 1st clause ("transactions by any person
other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer"). This will ordinarily cover closely-held
corporations, But it may not operate when the number of distributee shareholders is
large and the portfolio securities are control-related. See the text para. D(5) infra.
Narrower in scope are the $300,000 qualified exemption (§ 3(b) and Regulation A, 17
C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (Supp. 1961)) and the intrastate exemption (§ 3(a)(11)). (The use
of the latter by a non-issuer is not altogether clear; see 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 594
(2d ed. 1961).) Other exemptions are even more limited:
(a) Particular types of securities (e.g., §§ 3(a)(2)-(8), 3(c));
(b) Transfer by issuers (as distinct from owners) (§§ 3(a)(9), 4(1) 2d clause) or
dealers (§ 4(1) 3d clause) or brokers (§ 4(2));
(c) Particular transactions (e.g., § 3(a) (10)). For general discussion of exemptions,
see 1 Loss, Securities Regulations 559-715 (2d ed. 1961). It should be noted that an
exemption lifts the registration requirement but not the civil and criminal liabilities of
§§ 12(2) and 17.
17 Securities Act § 2(3).
18 Ibid.
111 But see Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 2(a) (23), 49 Stat. 804
(1935), 15 USC § 79h (1958), which defines sale without reference to value. The latter
demonstrates that Congress is capable of a broader definition if it so desires. For its
effect, see note 24 infra. For a general analysis of "value" in the definition of "sale,"
see 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 513-18 (2d ed. 1961).
2° Greyhound Corp. v. U.S., 53-1 USTC V 9326 (N.D. III. 1953) discussed at note
28 infra (dictum in deed tax case).
21 See note 34 infra (no transfer tax on certificates surrendered).
22 Securities Act § 12.
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Supporting analogy is found in the treatment afforded stock divi-
dends. The issuance of stock dividends is generally believed not to
involve a "sale" by the issuing corporation. 23
 Congress clearly thought
so. It deleted, as unnecessary, a House-passed exemption for stock
dividends with the explanation that "they do not constitute a sale, not
being given for value."' To the same effect is a rule stating that no
purchase or sale occurs when there is a pro rata distribution in cash
or in kind."
Further confirmation is found in the more distant realm of taxa-
tion. It has been held, for example, that a distribution of securities
and cash upon liquidation is subject to state income tax as a "dividend"
rather than as a "sale."' The stamp tax on each "deed . . . by which
any . . . realty sold shall be ... conveyed to the purchaser"" need
not be paid on assets distributed upon liquidation, if there are no
corporate debts.' On the other hand, if there are debts expressly
23
 This is implicit in Opin. of Gen. Conn., Sec. Act Rel. 929, (1936) discussed at
notes 36, 50 infra.
21
 H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933). See also 1 Loss, Securities
Regulation 517 n. 182 (2d ed. 1961) citing Sec. Act Rel. 3728 (1956), and his discussion
at 2 id. 1077 n. 176, 1082 n. 197 to the effect that stock dividends are not "purchases"
within the insider trading provisions of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 48
Stat. 896 (1934), 15 USC § 78p (1958). Compare the definition of "sale" in the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 2(a) (23), supra note 19, which makes both
stock dividends and liquidating distributions subject to SEC regulation. Similarly, stock
dividends of railroad carriers must be approved by the ICC pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Act, 41 Stat. 494 (1920), as amended, 49 USC § 20a (1958), because the pro-
vision expressly governs issuance and is not limited to sale. For further analysis see I
Loss, Securities Regulation 378 n. 20 (2d ed. 1961).
25
 Investment Company Act Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a5 (Supp. 1961). The
interpretation is limited to the terms as they appear in Investment Company Act § 17(a)
prohibiting certain transactions between investment companies and designated affiliates,
promoters and underwriters. It does not extend to the general definition of "sale" in
Investment Company Act § 2(a) (33) which is substantially the same as Securities Act
§ (3). The rule operates only if the stockholder has no election as to the specific assets
which he will receive.
28
 U.S. Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 299 Mass. 296,
13 N.E.2d 6 (1938) (gains from sales taxable at lower rates than dividends). But see S.
Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1924), reprinted 1939-1 (Part 2) Cum. Bull. 266,
274 accompanying the first federal income tax provision treating a liquidating distribu-
tion as a sale. The Report regards the transaction as a sale "in effect" and notes that
this is the only administratively feasible method of taxing it. It was also a concession
to the stockholder since it gave him the benefit of capital gains.
27
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4361 (emphasis added).
28 U.S. Treas. Regs. § 43.4361-2 (a) (8) (1959); Rev. Rul. 58-50, 1958-1 Cum. Bull.
461. Contrary dictum appears in the district court opinion in Greyhound Corp. v. U.S.,
208 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1954), an, 53-1 USTC ii 9326 (N.D. Ill. 1953), which states that
any liquidating distribution is for valuable consideration in the form of the stockholders'
rights evidenced by the stock surrendered. This ignores the extinction of the rights in
the dissolution process; see text para. C(1) supra. See also Deer Park Pine Industry,
Inc. v. County of Stevens, 46 Wash.2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955) (surrender of certificates
is form not substance; stockholder neither gains nor loses thereby).
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assumed, the stamp tax applies.' The result seems to be the same if
the debts are merely taken "subject to."" The prevailing theory in
the deed tax domain is that any assets in excess of liabilities are trans-
ferred without consideration, while the remainder are purchased by
the shareholders from the corporation (or from its creditors who have
paramount rights in the assets to the extent of their claims).31 By
contrast, the stamp tax on stock," which applies to a "transfer" as
well as to 'a "sale," is imposed on portfolio securities distributed in
liquidation.' However, even this tax is not imposed on shares sur-
rendered to the dissolving corporation since these are not considered
transferred.34
2. No Individual Action. A second theory has roots in securi-
ties law (or at least in securities administration). It is the principle of
Rule 133 35
 that "no sale" occurs for Securities Act purposes when
20 Greyhound Corp. v. U. S., ibid; R. H. Macy & Co. v. U.S., 107 F. Supp. 883
(S.DN.Y. 1952); U.S. Treas. Regs. § 43.4361-2(a)(8) (1959) ; Rev. Rul. 54-363, 1954-2
Cum, Bull. 428. Earlier cases to the contrary, Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Jones, 57
F. Supp. 482 (W. D. Okla, 1944) and Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Sheehan, 50 F. Supp.
1010 (E. D. Mo. 1943) apparently are no longer law. Both involved debts and, at least
in the latter, the debts were expressly assumed. The theory of the last-cited case is
that the stockholder (parent corporation) was the equitable owner of the assets and
that the deed did not transfer title but merely showed the transfer on the public records.
It further states that the conveyances were not in consideration of the assumption of
debts since the assets exceeded the debts; hence, the transfer was without valuable con-
sideration. All four cases .were indiscriminately cited as "persuasive" in holding no tax
under an almost identical state statute, State v. Green, 88 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1956) (par-
tial liquidation). See also Deer Park Pine Industry, Inc. v. County of Stevens, supra
note 28, (where debts were assumed, there was a "conveyance . . . for a valuable con-
sideration" within language of ordinance taxing real estate sales).
30
 U.S. Treas. Regs. § 43.4361-2(a)(8) (1959); Rev. Rul. 58-50, 1958-1 Cum. Bull.
461.
31 Greyhound Corp. v. U.S., supra note 28. See Special Ruling, Oct. 23, 1942, CCH
1942 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. 11 6566, CCH Fed. Excise Tax Rep. 1[ 3319.16 for method of
allocating consideration (debts) between realty and other property distributed.
32 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4321.
33
 Apparently nothing squarely so holds, but it is established practice among the
corporate bar. Cf. U.S. Treas. Regs. 4321-2(a) (10) and (11) (1959) (stock dividends
subject to tax); Transamerica Corp. v. Lewis, 126 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1942) (non-liqui-
dating distribution of portfolio securities; parties admitted tax due; dispute over com-
putation). See also North American Co. v. Green, 120 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1960) (spin-off
after 100-for-1 split taxable under state statute virtually identical to Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 4321). Certain transfers by operation of law are exempt from this stamp tax,
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4343(a), but they do not include dividends in shares of an-
other corporation; the designated exemptions are exclusive, Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 4343(b).
34 U.S. Treas. Regs. § 43.4321-2(b) (3) (1959). Glenn L. Martin Co. v. U.S., 21
F.Supp. 562 (D. Md. 1937) (surrender to going concern, without consideration, to facili-
tate refinancing); Transamerica Corp. v. Lewis, 28 F.Supp. 765 (N. D. Cal. 1939),
appeal dismissed by stipulation, 108 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1940) (cash purchase by going
concern for retirement).
33 Securities Act Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (Supp. 1961).
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stockholders take corporate (rather than individual) action by voting
in a prescribed majority for certain mergers or other reorganizations."
Although the rule is not primarily concerned with liquidations, the
rationale would seem equally applicable, since the stockholder vote for
dissolution in most jurisdictions resembles the one for merger. Indeed,
Rule 133(c) 87 specifically allows a constituent corporation (e.g., one
which has sold its assets for securities of another company, or has
acquired securities of another company in a merger or consolidation)
to distribute in complete or partial liquidation the securities received.38
A fortiori, securities already held by a corporation should be exempt
from registration when distributed pursuant to a liquidation plan voted
upon by the shareholders.
3. Stockholders Already Owners. Since the stockholders are the
equitable owners of the net corporate assets at dissolution," one may
plausibly argue that no "sale" to them has taken place when the assets
are formally transferred. The transfer is merely to perfect an existing
title.4°
D. AREAS OF POSSIBLE APPLICABILITY OF SECURITIES LAWS
The foregoing analysis should indicate that ordinary liquidating
distributions of portfolio securities involve no sale and are not subject
to the registration or other provisions of the Securities Act of 1933.
One reason for the elaborate argument is to generate ideas which may
be helpful in variant situations where the law is less clear. Some of
these are sketched below, with the caveat that most conclusions must
be tentative in the present undeveloped state of affairs. In specific situ-
36 For a full discussion of the rationale, see 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 521-24 (2d
ed. 1961). The same idea probably underlies Investment Company Act Rule 17a-5, dis-
cussed supra note 25, which is conditioned on the absence of any election by the indivi-
dual shareholder. But see Opin. of Gen. Coun., Sec. Act Rel. 929, 11 F.R. 10957, CCH
Fed. Sec. Law Rep, 11 2125.21 (1936), stating that there is no Securities Act "sale"
where each stockholder is given in advance an election to take either a cash dividend or
a stock dividend; the Opinion is to the contrary, if, after a cash dividend is declared, a
stock dividend is offered as an alternative. The Opinion is concerned not so much with
individual action as with release of accrued money rights. See also the SEC's dictum
that Rule 133, supra note 35, is inapplicable where control is so concentrated that stock-
holder approval is "a mere formality," Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd., 37 SEC 683, 691
(1957), aff'd without opinion, 256 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
37 Supra note 35.
38
 This statement first appeared in the Rule in 1959 but the idea was accepted by
the SEC much earlier; see 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 520 n. 195 (2d ed. 1961); Letter
from Chief Coun., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, CCH Fed. Sec. Law Rep. Q 2128.03 (Feb.
10, 1948).
" Supra note 7.
40 This theory was used to support one of the earlier deed tax decisions, Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. v. Sheehan, supra note 29 (and see the accompanying discussion).
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ations it may be possible and prudent to obtain opinions or "no-action"
letters from the SEC.'
1. Satisfaction of Creditors' Claims. Although the concern here is
mainly with transfers to shareholders, it is worth noting that transfers
in liquidation are sometimes made to creditors in satisfaction of their
claims. Such transfers are undoubtedly sales. Value is present; so is
individual action on the part of the creditor (since he is foregoing a
claim to be paid in money). Registration will be required unless the
transaction is otherwise exempt."
2. Satisfaction of Liquidation Preferences. A preferred share-
holder, like a creditor but inferior to him in rank, is ordinarily entitled
to be paid in cash." If he individually agrees to be paid in portfolio
securities, there may well be a "sale" within the Securities Act. On the
other hand, if a valid plan of dissolution adopted by the shareholders
specifies distribution of portfolio securities in satisfatcion of liquida-
tion preferences, the absence of individual (as opposed to corporate)
action may preclude a "sale."" Moreover, the adoption of the plan
simultaneously eliminates his money claim and solidifies his status as
equitable owner of the designated portfolio assets. Accordingly, the
theories that stockholders give no value in liquidation and that they are
already owners should operate.
3. Assumption of Debts. It is well established that shareholders
take the corporate assets subject to corporate debts," and they may
expressly assume them in order to expedite the liquidation or continue
an advantageous credit arrangement. It already has been observed that
assumption, and probably taking "subject to," amounts to a "sale"
under the stamp tax on deeds." There, however, the "sale" is only to
the extent of the debts; the rest of the distribution is gratuitous. Such
a distinction is hardly workable in deciding whether the securities must
be registered. If any value is given, there is presumably a "sale" com-
pelling registration.47
 This all-or-nothing rule argues against extend-
41 See Thomas, Federal Securities Act Handbook 45-46 (1959).
42 Cf. note 16 supra.
43 Ballantine, Corporations 734-35 (rev. ed. 1946). Cf. Bowman v. Armour & Co.,
17 1.11.2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 753 (1959) (invalidating recapitalization plan for redemption of
preferred by payment in debentures).
44 See para. C(2) supra.
45 Supra note 7.
46 Cf. text accompanying notes 29, 30 supra.
47
 Securities Act § 2(3). The section also states that a bonus given with a pur-
chased security is "conclusively presumed" to have been purchased "for value." Segre-
gating the consideration and limiting it to the amount of the debts makes sense in Secur-
ities Act § 12 where the measure of damages for a sale in violation of the registration
requirement is "the consideration paid."
8
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ing the deed tax precedents to securities law. But there can be no
assurance that this would not be done, particularly in a flagrant case."
Since few liquidating corporations are so fortunate as to be debt-
free, this problem can arise quite frequently. Some gradations are
discernible. Express assumption of known debts looks much more like
"value" and entails far more individual action than taking subject to
unknown debts. The latter almost certainly cannot precipitate a
"sale."" The consequences of less pronounced situations are not clear.
In all instances, caution suggests the discharge of debts with corporate
assets before distribution of portfolio securities.
4. Stockholder's Choice. Ordinarily, pro rata distribution is the
only kind that is practical. But there may be instances where the
shareholders are given a choice among various securities (e.g., in a
split-up) or between securities and cash. In either case, there is indi-
vidual action and perhaps "value" in the release of one alternative.'
A considerable (but not unthinkable) extension of this concept would
be necessary to turn this into a "sale"; the risk cannot be altogether
ignored.
A similar problem may arise where the corporation arranges facil-
ities for disposition of the portfolio securities for the account of share-
holders after distribution.'
5. Control-Related Securities. Problems involving control arise
in two general ways. The portfolio securities may themselves represent
control (e.g., securities of a subsidiary). Or, they may have been ac-
quired from the issuer or someone in a "control relation" with the
issuer.52 In either case, the liquidating corporation will be a statutory
48 Consider, for example, a block of securities purchased on credit shortly prior to
dissolution and distributed subject to the purchase money debt, Cf. text, para, D(5)
infra, concerning distribution of control-related securities.
4q Such a rule would seem to make every liquidation a sale or, equally intolerable,
leave the question to be answered by future events, i.e., the assertion of claims. One
way out of the dilemma might be the often used escrow or retention fund to meet con-
tingencies. But too large a fund would deprive the shareholders of the use of the assets;
too small a one might leave them "subject to" debts not satisfied out of it.
541 Cf. Opin. of Gen. Coun., Sec. Act Rel. 929 (1936) discussed supra note 36 (no
"value," hence no "sale" where each stockholder in a going concern is offered the choice
between a cash dividend and a stock dividend). The Opinion states that a waiver or
surrender of a right or claim ordinarily constitutes "value" and that a "sale" would
occur if a stockholder were offered stock in lieu of an already declared cash dividend.
51- See discussion at the end of para. D(5) of the text. There should he no question
about acquisition or disposition to round out fractional shares; these are de minimis; cf.
Securities Act Rule 133(b), supra note 35, last sentence; 1 Loss, Securities Regulation
651-52 (2d ed. 1961).
52 The phrase is shorthand for "any person directly or indirectly controlling or con-
trolled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the
issuer" in Securities Act 2(11). "Control" is defined as "the possession, direct or indi-
rect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a
9
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"underwriter" 53 if it took with a view to "distribution." 54 "Distribu-
tion" in the statutory sense just mentioned is the antonym of "invest-
ment," but not necessarily the synonym of distribution to shareholders
in liquidation. The statutory concept is roughly equivalent to "public
offering."55
 If the dissolving corporation is publicly held, its liquidating
distribution looks very much like a public offering. But there is one
crucial difference: the absence of "value." Apparently, no court has
ever had occasion to say that a "distribution" occurs only if the dis-
tributees give "value," but this is almost surely a correct statement.
Since it already has been concluded that "value" is not given by share-
holders in corporate liquidation," it follows that a dissolving corpora-
tion is not an "underwriter." Even if "value" were not essential to
"distribution," the consequences would be slight: the unavailability of
an exemption 57
 from the registration requirement." Registration is
not required at all if, as argued earlier, no "sale" takes place because
of the absence of "value."
The foregoing analysis presumes that the essential "value" must
pass to the dissolving corporation as the putative distributor. But
"distribution" vel non is a complex question to be determined by exam-
ination of the total environment. Conceivably there might be a statu-
tory distribution because of "value" going to (a) the issuer or
controlling person from whom the liquidating corporation obtained the
stock, or to (b) the controlling Stockholders of the liquidating corpora-
tion.59 Or, a distribution might be discerned in the subsequent sale of
the portfolio securities by the liquidating corporation's stockholders
(who would thereby receive "value"). It is at least theoretically pos-
person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise,"
Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. 1 230.405 (1949). For a full discussion of control
concepts under the SEC statutes, see 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 764-83 (2d ed. 1961).
For a general discussion of secondary distributions, see Gilchrist & Hanna, Secondary
Distributions of Corporate Securities, 13 SW.L.J. 1 (1959).
53 Securities Act § 2(11).
54 We ignore the other "underwriter" definition in Securities Act § 2(11) (one who
sells for an issuer in connection with a distribution) since it will rarely arise in a bona
fide corporate dissolution.
55
 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 551 (2d ed. 1961); Oklahoma-Texas Trust, 2 SEC
764, 769 (1937), aff'd sub nom. Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888, (10th Cir.
1939); Ira Haupt & Co., 23 SEC 589, 597 (1946); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d
461, 466-68 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. den., 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
56 Text para. C(1) supra.
zi 7 Securities Act § 4(1) 1st clause: "Transactions by any person other than an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer."
58 Securities Act § 5.
59
 An example might be the enhancement in value of their individual securities
through the creation of a market for similar securities distributed from the corporate
portfolio.
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sible that the liquidating corporation would be party to a statutory
distribution, though unwitting or unwilling.
Principles of vicarious responsibility are familiar in securities law.
Areas come readily to mind where transfers by transferees affect the
status of the first transferor.' While all of these are dependent on par-
ticular provisions not applicable to liquidations, they could easily pro-
vide precedent.
How, then, will it be possible to distinguish the legitimate from
the illegitimate? The spin-off of a newly created subsidiary and the
formation of a new corporation in the process of a split-up both seem
to fall within the literal language requiring registration. In each case
securities come from the issuer (the subsidiary, which receives "value"
in the form of assets transferred) to the parent who takes with a
"view" to (and in fact accomplishes) distribution to its shareholders.
Rule 13381
 probably shields the latter arrangement (assuming a proper
plan and stockholder vote) but not the former. By contrast, a liqui-
dating corporation might be an attractive vehicle to scatter worthless
securities (paid for from corporate assets prior to dissolution)." A
mechanical test, such as the time the securities are held in portfolio, is
hardly sufficient. The "good faith" criterion, though recently vitiated,"
is bound to remain significant. The ultimate resolution perhaps lies in
60 (a) Private Offerings. A private sale by one person is not exempt if his pur-
chasers take with a view to (and do effect) public distribution. Gilligan, Will & Co. v.
SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. den., 361 U.S. 896 (1959) ; Crowell-Collier Pub-
lishing Co., Sec. Act Rel. 3825 (1957). See 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 665-73 (2d ed.
1961)
(b) Intrastate Offerings. An intrastate sale by one person is not exempt if his pur-
chasers take with a view to (and do effect) sales outside the state. Brooklyn Manhattan
Transit Corp., 1 SEC 147 (1935) ; Sec. Act Rel. 4386 (1961) ; Opin. of Gen. Coun., Sec.
Act Rel. 1459 (1937). See 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 595-97 (2d ed. 1961).
(c) Rule 133 Transactions. The "no sale" theory for mergers and other reorganiza-
tions may be destroyed for the constituent corporations because their shareholders partici-
pate in or permit further distribution. Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd., 37 SEC 683 (1957),
aff'd without opinion, 256 F.2d 893 M.C. Cir. 1958); SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls,
Inc., 148 F.Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. Fi57) (preliminary injunction), 167 F.Supp. 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (final injunction), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d
Cir. 1959). Cf. Securities Act Rule 133(b), supra note 35 (purchaser from stockholders
for distribution is an underwriter). By Rule 133(c), supra note 35, a constituent cor-
poration is an underwriter if it takes with a view to distribution, but (as noted in the
text at note 38 supra) a transfer to shareholders in complete or partial liquidation is
not a distribution in this sense, Sometimes the corporation is within the Rule but its
shareholders are not, Sec. Act Rel. 3846 (1957).
61 Supra note 35.
62
 For examples, see cases cited in note 60 supra.
63 SEC v. Guild Films, Inc., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960) ("distribution" by
pledgee).
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a "business purpose" test of the kind used in gauging income tax con-
sequences of corporate reorganizations."
In the current embryonic stage of the law, there is not much the
liquidating corporation can do with absolute confidence. It can, of
course, try to avoid involvement in a "dumping" scheme. It may want
to take "investment letters' from some of the larger shareholders as
a means of minimizing market activity in the portfolio securities. To
the same end, it should probably refrain from encouraging dealers to
trade in the portfolio securities after distribution, although this might
frustrate a natural desire to aid the stockholders.
E THE BLUE SKY LAWS
The multiplicity and diversity of state "blue sky" laws" makes
it difficult to generalize about them. The trouble is compounded by
the paucity of published interpretationr vagueness as to persons
civilly liable" and obliviousness to such points as secondary distribu-
tions." However, the "blue sky" laws are relatively harmonious and
clear in the aspect most basic to this article. Virtually all those which
require some sort of securities registration condition the requirement
on "sale."" Their definitions of sale fall into several classes:
(1) Approximately seventy per cent define "sale" in
terms of . "value." The argument that stockholders give no
value in liquidation should suffice for them.
(2) Another ten per cent define "sale" in terms of "con-
sideration!" 71 Probably these should be regarded as sub-
stantially like the "value" states."
(3) The remainder define "sale" in terms of any dispo-
sition or transfer," or in some other manner," or not at all."
64 E.g., Eittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 15, 323-
25, 392-93 (1959); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935).
66 For content of investment letters, see Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of
Private Placement, 45 Va. L. Rev. 851, 861 (1959) ; Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering:
Hazards for the Unwary, 45 Va. L. Rev. 869, 873-75 (1959).
66 Cf. Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky Law 17-42 (1958).
67 Cf. id. at 62-86.
Bs Cf. id. at 135-36.
69 Cf. id. at 316-17.
76 An exception, which may be more apparent than real, is Nebraska, Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 81-314 (1958) (sale or exchange).
71 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-265(E) (1960); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-304(2) (1958) ;
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 59.030(1) (1959); R.I. Gen. Ann. § 7-11-1(d)(1956).
72 Cf. 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 513 (2d ed. 1961).
73 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110 A, § 2(d) (1958); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Baldwin
1958) § 1707.01(C)(1).
74
 Mich. Comp. Laws § 451.102(d) (1948); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 409.020(10) (1949)
("value" implied).
75 Ida., N.Y., N.H., Wyo.
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The situation in these states is cloudy. However some have
exemptions which cover liquidating distributionsw or which
might be stretched to do so."
As a practical matter, the state problem is probably much smaller
in dimension than the federal.
F. CONCLUSION
A routine liquidating distribution of portfolio securities is almost
certainly not intended to require registration with the SEC or approval
by the blue sky administrators, and they (or the courts) would prob-
ably so rule if faced with the problem. The potential for abuse and
need for information (at which the statutes are aimed) is just not
significant in dissolutions.
Nonetheless, the laws were apparently drafted with no thought
for this problem. Their inapplicability can be established only indi-
rectly. The principal reason is that they operate only if there is a
sale for "value," and shareholders give none in liquidation. Two other
theories are that the requisite individual action is lacking and that the
transfer is only a formality recognizing the stockholders' equitable
ownership of the corporate assets at dissolution.
Areas of considerable doubt remain. Distributions in satisfaction
of debt have the magic "value"; so may distributions in satisfaction
of liquidation preferences, although this should depend on how the
distribution plan was determined. Assumption of debt by stockholders
may trigger the statutes, but taking assets subject to debts seems less
likely to do so. Legislative, or administrative exclusion or exemption
here is desirable, particularly in view of the relative frequency of
debts. The most difficult questions center around "control-related"
securities where the danger of abuse is greatest. This is the respect in
which guidance from statutes or regulations would be most welcome.
Yet it is the one for which objective tests are hardest to fashion.
76 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110 A, § 3(E) (1958).
77 E.g., isolated transactions, Mich. Comp. Laws § 451.105(c) (1948) ; Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 409.050(3) (1949); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Baldwin 1958) § 1707.03(B) ; distributions to
stockholders, Mich. Comp. Laws § 451.105(d) (1948) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Baldwin
1958) § 1707.03(K) (1) ; certain securities outstanding five years or more, Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 409.050(11) (Sapp. 1960).
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